temporarily. Through this mechanism, the government issues debt to finance its spending and the central bank acquires the debt, leaving the system with an increased capacitance of base money. This monetary base provision is required to maintain sufficient cash and cash-equivalent assets to be used for payments and settlements in the monetary system. The quite infamous bank-sovereign nexus (Leonello, 2017) is less a vicious circle than a consequence of this institutional organisation of governmental debt refinancing and its quasi-monetary nature. Recent macroeconomic contributions point to this link between treasures and central banks in case of money-financed fiscal stimulus (Turner, 2015) .
Another public sector specificity concerns governmental assurance of collective obligations and guarantees. The refinancing mechanism explained above enables issuing fresh debt to roll over debt obligations that become due, instead of repaying them from tax revenues. The assurance mechanism consists in promising to cover for possible future payments -such as 'pay-as-you-go' pension obligations -when they become due, but governments are not yet liable for them today. Generally speaking, these commitments remain then unfunded and do not involve refinancing needs on their financial position until and unless they become due. All these collective guarantees and contingencies do presently exist as potential (but not yet actual) governmental liabilities (Coeuré, 2007) .
In sum, public debt management relates to the refinancing process and the assurance of collective obligations such as pensions, showing the link between the fiscal system (taxing power), the monetary base (involving the quasi-money nature of sovereign debt), and the welfare policies. In this context, financial sustainability does not involve only the capacity to sustain the burden of interest charges and capital instalments through tax revenues, but also the ongoing capacity to both monetize this burden for sake of monetary base management, and place it with resident and foreign debt-holders, as well as with related governmental entities. Japan's sovereign debt management policy mix constitutes one relevant illustrative example of high and sustainable public debt outstanding that is mostly denominated in national currency, largely managed by the central Bank of Japan (and resident monetary financial institutions) and mainly held by resident investors. Vice-versa, some international sovereign debt restructuration shows the additional difficulties that arise when public debt management involves issuances in foreign currencies and through foreign networks (CONVIVIUM, 2016) .
Our analysis raises new questions for the public debate on public debt management. If governmental debt has to be repaid as it is the case for business entities: how to achieve welfare policies (involving redistribution)? How to constitute and manage the monetary base? If future commitments -such as 'pay-as-you-go' pension obligations -have to be funded when they accrue: Why start paying interest charges today to fund future commitments that may never materialise? Why take and hold funding risk and leveraged investment risk since today for those faraway future commitments?
The functioning of government differs from that of a business entity, requiring a specific institutional framework (GASB -Governmental Accounting Standards Board 2013). However, this functioning process has never prevented modern states to be funded and refinanced for centuries by final investors active on Securities Exchanges. Those investors have been accepting for long that structural debt is issued and refinanced over time to cover governmental expenditure, including for investment purpose (Ragot, 2017; Ragot & Saraceno, 2016) . Not to mention the overarching constitutional project involved in designing and managing the monetary base of a polity (Desan, 2014) .
All together, these specificities of financial sustainability in central government require specific accounting treatments to be consistently represented and governed. Notwithstanding the favour by international accounting standards for both the private (IFRS) and the public sector (IPSAS), a balance sheet accounting basis appears to be inconsistent with these specificities. Financial reporting on this basis generally shows material negative net assets that prove public debt use to cover for investment and operating expenses over time. However, its representation through negative net assets may be misleading for managers, citizens and policy-makers. On the one hand, this representation does not address the redistributive purpose that overarches the functioning of government. On the other hand, it does not inform on the specific use of public debt issuance and refinancing that generates negative net assets.
In its recommended practice guideline, the IPSAS Board -International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (2013) acknowledges the debt dimension of long-term sustainability of a public sector entity's finances. Accordingly, information on net debt assists users in assessing the entity's ability to meet its financial commitments as they become due or to maintain, refinance or increase its levels of debt and thereby evaluate the sustainability of the entity's debt.
It is time to reconsider public sector balance sheet and cash flow statements to better represent and control for this specific working of public finances. Accrual-based accounting statements may then be combined with cash-based accounting statements prepared for budgetary purposes. Public debate on public debt management may be better served and informed by an accounting representation that consistently considers the specificities of public finances concerning public debt issuance, public debt refinancing, and non-debt commitments.
